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After liberation from German occupation at the end of the Second World War, 
people  suspected  of  collaboration  with  the  occupier  were  arrested  and 
subsequently interned in one of the numerous internment camps in Belgium 
and  the  Netherlands.  It  is  estimated  that  more  than  120,000  people  were 
interned in the Netherlands and 70,000 in Belgium
3. During their period of 
exile in London, the Belgian and Dutch governments had both prepared plans 
for  the  use  of  administrative  internment  for  civilians  suspected  of 
collaboration with the German occupier. Administrative internment refers to 
the  incarceration  of  persons  or  groups  on  the  suspicion  that  they  might 
endanger the legitimacy of the state or more specifically the maintenance of 
law  and  order.  As  such,  it  is  an  authoritarian  measure.  Its  use  by  such 
democratic  states  as  Belgium  and  the  Netherlands  is,  however,  easily 
explained by the extraordinary political and ideological circumstances of the 
Second  World  War  and  the  widespread  chaos  existing  in  its  immediate 
aftermath. Administrative internment is, in general, viewed as a temporary 
measure  fit  for  exceptional  conditions  in  extraordinary  times,  with  less 
comprehensive and less complete legal guarantees for internees than for those 
arrested under normal circumstances and handled under normal procedures. 
The  preparations  of  the  Belgian  and  Dutch  governments  for  internment 
involved  for  instance  drawing  up  lists  of  the  places  for  internment  and 
appointing  people  responsible  for  the  actual  implementation  of  these 
measures. Furthermore, the legal framework for this form of incarceration had 
to be thought out. Following the liberation of Belgium and the Netherlands, 
those preparations were finally put to the test. In this paper, we will analyse 
and  compare  the  Dutch  and  Belgian  internment  plans  and  practices, 
describing  the  preparations  for administrative  internment  in  both countries 
and explaining the differences. Furthermore, we will give a general overview 
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of  how  internment  was  effectively  put  to  use.  Starting  out  from  the  two 
countries’  different  historical  and  legal  backgrounds,  we  will  look  into 
whether and, if so, how these circumstances influenced policymakers in the 
shape  and  content  of  administrative  internment  as  a  measure  in  the  penal 
framework. 
Internment plans during the war: the legal framework 
In the first half of 1942, the Belgian government-in-exile in London already 
foresaw the need for internment camps during and after the liberation of the 
country.  It  set  up  a  committee  consisting  of  politicians,  lawyers  and 
magistrates, and giving it the responsibilty for drawing up measures to ensure 
the maintenance of law and order and also for preparing measures to punish 
collaborators. Government official A. Delierneux was included as an external 
member due to his expertise in the use of administrative internment prior to 
the  Second  World  War.  In  this  committee,  the  first  steps  to  design 
administrative internment were taken. In the mind of the committee members, 
administrative internment was meant to offer protection to people afraid of 
being subjected to public vengeance on the street, a potential danger for all 
those who had collaborated with the enemy. The basic idea was that those 
who felt threatened would come to the governmental authorities on their own 
accord  for  temporary  incarceration.  The  committee  wanted  to  avoid  the 
installation of a measure resembling the German “Schutzhaft”, i.e. the extra-
judicial  arrest  of  political  opponents  and  Jews.  Instead,  this  measure  for 
internment was defended as an act providing protection from the wrath of the 
population
4. 
The Belgian government received several disquieting reports about the state 
of public opinion in occupied Belgium. While the necessity for administrative 
internment remained unquestioned, no decisions were made for its effective 
implementation.  These  reports  came  from  different  sources,  such  as 
politicians  or  others  representatives  of  political  currents.  One  important 
example  stems  from  the  Independence  Front,  the  largest  civil  resistance 
organization in Belgium. Dated November 1943, this report states:“[…] la 
question du châtiment des collaborateurs et des profiteurs de guerre, du haut 
en bas de l'échelle. 'Faire expier' et 'faire rendre gorge' sont les maîtres mots 
d'un appel qui met en garde contre une ‘politique de coups d'éponge’ après 
quelques  exécutions  par  l'exemple.  Si  tel  était  le  cas,  on  risquerait  un 
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'véritable soulèvement”
5.The Belgian government did not want to lose control 
once  the  country  was  liberated.  In  this  context,  it  was  deemed  strictly 
undesirable for the Resistance and for the oppressed and resentful population 
to get their hands on the collaborators. This explains why the government 
wanted to gain direct control of the country as soon as the military situation 
and the Allies would allow them to do so. The establishment of the High 
Commissariat for State Security (HC) had, in part, the goal of preventing the 
left-  and  right-wing  Belgian  Resistance  movements  from  seizing  power. 
During the liberation phase, the HC would coordinate and control the regular 
state organizations in charge of securing law and order. In 1943, Walter Jean 
Ganshof van der Meersch, the head of the Military Prosecution Office was 
appointed High Commissioner. He had a well-deserved reputation as a firm 
leader and had experience in administrative internment, having been involved 
at the start of the Second World War in the implementation of internment 
measures targeting various sections of the population considered dangerous to 
the internal safety of the state. In his coordinating and controlling function, 
Ganshof  was  predestined  to  play  an  important  role  for  administrative 
internment during and immediately after the liberation of Belgium.  
Unlike in the Netherlands, the legitimacy of Belgian state authority was not 
self-evident during its occupation. In May 1940, King Leopold III chose to 
stay in the occupied country. This led to a major dispute between the King 
and the government which wanted to leave Belgium and in the end effectively 
did. The King’s  choice  to  stay  behind  and try  to come  to  terms  with the 
German occupation forces made him a prisoner of the occupier. This was a 
constitutionally impossible situation in the eyes of the government led by the 
catholic Hubert Pierlot. This political rift engendered a lot of insecurity and 
instability for the government-in-exile, with the King breaking off contact to 
Pierlot  and  his  ministers  for  the  whole  period  of  exile.  This  left  the 
government unsure about his views on the legitimacy of the ministers-in-exile 
for  the  post-war  period.  The  situation  was  made  worse  by  the  two  major 
resistance movements in Belgium, who were by no means neutral with regard 
to the King’s position. The “Secret Army” stood at the side of Leopold III, 
while  the  Independence  Front  –  in  part  due  to  the  strong  presence  of 
communists – no longer accepted him as the Belgian monarch. Moreover, the 
position of the Belgian government in London was also unstable. The long 
stay in France and the doubts of most ministers whether to come to England 
had tarnished their reputation in the minds of the Allied governments. On top 
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of those uncertainties, up to 1943 the Belgium Prime Minister Hubert Pierlot 
and  his  ministers  also  had  to  cope  with  a  great  deal  of  friction  from  the 
remnants of the Belgian army – divided for and against Leopold III – on the 
one hand and from the available parliamentarians on the other. These were 
mostly socialists and liberals, while the ministers, on the whole, were more 
right-wing and conservative
6. 
Table 1 
The Dutch Queen Wilhelmina and the Belgian King Leopold III together in Amsterdam, 1938 
All these uncertainties caused the Belgium government to be careful not to 
overdo  any  kind  of  innovation.  They  wanted  to  avoid  the  reproach  of 
unconstitutionality. Were the King and/or the Belgian magistrates to adopt 
such  a  stance,  the  Belgian  state  could  quickly  tumble  into  a  state  of 
revolution.  The  government  was,  as  said,  always  careful  not  to  fuel  the 
possibility of a right-wing authoritarian coup on the one hand, possibly with 
the support of the King, or a communist attempt to seize power on the other.  
The  situation  for  the  Netherlands  was  quite  different.  One  important 
difference  was  the  position  of  the  monarchy.  In  contrast  to  Belgium,  the 
Dutch Queen Wilhelmina had already left the Netherlands together with her 
ministers  on  May  13,  1940,  going  into  exile  in  London.  Through  radio 
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broadcasts the Queen tried to stay in contact the Dutch people back home, 
encouraging  them  to  endure  the  occupation  heroically  and  expressing  her 
strong  views  against  collaboration  with the  enemy
7.  The  Queen  spoke  for 
instance  about  the  disintegration  of  society  resulting  from  collaboration, 
referring  to  “the  struggle  between  good  and  evil”  and  encouraging  anti-
collaboration activities by saying: “anyone who acts at the right time, knocks 
the  Nazi’s  on  their  head”.  One  issue  she  regularly  addressed  was  the 
punishment of collaboration after the war. As early as 1941 she was speaking 
of “the handful of traitors, for whom there will be no room in a liberated 
Netherlands.” In later broadcasts she went on to mention the “removal all 
unwanted elements”, referring to the members of the Dutch Nazi party which 
had about 100,000 members. In the interwar years this pro-German movement 
had already been the subject of overall rejection, with hatred reaching boiling 
point during the war.  
Through calling for the removal of all traitors, it comes as no surprise that the 
Dutch  government  anticipated  many  arrests  after  liberation.  How  did  they 
provide the  legal  measures  to  do  this?  Established in  early  1943  with  the 
ultimate goal of maintaining public order in the Dutch liberated zones, the 
Netherlands  Military  Authority  (NMA)  –  similar  to  the  Belgian  High 
Commissariat  for  State  Security  –  had  the  responsibility  of  temporarily 
coordinating and controlling the regular state organizations in charge of law 
and order. However, unlike the HC, the Dutch NMA was supposed to act as a 
temporary  independent  military  administration,  subordinate  only  to  the 
Minister of War. The choice in favour of a military government seemed most 
practical  at  the  time,  ensuring  smooth  contact  with  the  Allied  forces  and 
giving the NMA the capacity to take drastic measures. The Special Act of 
Siege, adopted in September 1943, gave it the legitimacy to act very quickly. 
This Act complemented the martial law proclaimed on April 19, 1940 under 
the imminent threat of war. Martial law was legitimised by the law on the 
State  of  Siege  and  War  of  May  23,  1899.  As  such,  it  enabled  military 
authorities  to  undertake  action  without  having  to  first  consult  the  civil 
authorities, allowing them to act very quickly
8.  
Despite  the  obvious  benefits,  a  number  of  ministers  objected  to  the 
establishment  of temporary  military  rule  due  to  its authoritarian  character. 
This  anxiety  they  had  in  common  with  their  Belgian  counterparts.  The 
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unstable  Belgian  government  was  not  in  a  position  to  accept a  temporary 
military government possibly further challenging its regained control of the 
state administrations. However, fear that the Allied forces might themselves 
take over power led the Dutch ministers to nevertheless agree to military rule, 
as long as the necessary emphasis was put on the temporality of the measure
9.  
Alongside  this  difference  between  Belgium  and  the  Netherlands  on  the 
decision to transfer power to a military authority, there was another important 
difference  between  the  two  countries.  The  Belgian  government  was  not 
prepared to innovate outside the structure of Belgian penal law, in which the 
experience and justice policy of the government in power during the First 
World War was paramount. While the Netherlands had had the possibility to 
remain neutral in the Great War, Belgium, as one of the main battlegrounds, 
had been forced to take part. To be able to punish new forms of misconduct 
(collaboration with the Germans), the Belgian government at the time had to 
modernize Belgian penal law, with the decree of 8
th April 1917 adding two 
new offenses: political collaboration with the enemy and denunciation to the 
enemy. During the Second World War, Belgium was already prepared for the 
punishment of “political collaboration”. As such, there was no incentive to 
make  any  major  changes  to  the  existing  penal  law.  The  unforeseeable 
situation of the second German occupation only led policy-makers to adapt 
this article in minor ways during their exile in London. On another level, the 
policy-makers also retained the division of competence between the civil and 
military courts, as adopted by the Belgian parliament during the 1930s. This 
meant that during times of war the military courts were also competent to 
judge crimes committed against the state by civilians.  
The Dutch government-in-exile went a great deal further in supplementing 
their existing criminal laws with the Extraordinary Criminal Justice Decisions 
of  September  1943.  Unlike  Belgium,  there  was  no  previously  modernised 
legislation to turn to and extend. In London, the Dutch government created a 
new set of special acts (“Royal Decisions”), defining for instance the concept 
of “political collaboration”. These new special acts would allow those having 
committed crimes against state security during the war to be prosecuted by 
civilian courts (not military, as in Belgium)
10. The main crime against state 
security  during  the  war  was  direct  cooperation  with  the  occupier.  Other 
activities considered as crimes included exposing others to enemy violence, 
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for example by betraying people in hiding. With the Extraordinary Criminal 
Justice  Decisions,  Dutch  civilian  courts  could  pronounce  sentences  of  life 
imprisonment and even the death penalty, abolished in 1870. Furthermore, 
collaborators could be sentenced to 10-year internment and the loss of their 
civil rights during this period. Such long internment indicates that, unlike the 
Belgian government, the Dutch government did not see the use of internment 
merely as a short temporary action for maintaining law and order. 
Plans for internment camps  
The establishment of the NMA and the HC and the development of a legal 
framework for the punishment of collaborators also meant that plans were 
drawn up for administrative internment. In the case of Belgium, once again, 
the experience of the First World War proved to be central in the elaboration 
of the measure. The draft circular sent by Belgian magistrates from Brussels 
to London during the first half of 1943 closely followed earlier adopted legal 
texts. First, there was the decree-law of 11 October 1916, constituting the first 
step towards administrative internment in the Belgian legal framework. This 
decree-law allowed the government to evacuate people from places where 
they could cause harm. The categories of people concerned were recidivists, 
foreigners, suspect persons due to their relations with the enemy and the broad 
last  group:  any  other  person  potentially  hampering  the  course  of  military 
operations. The follow-up decree-law of 12 October 1918 effectively made 
administrative internment a possible measure for the duration of war. The 
government  gained  the  power  to  intern  people  and  keep  them  away  from 
places where they could harm military operations. The people targeted were 
first  and  foremost  foreigners  and  naturalized  persons  whose  original 
nationality  was  that  of  the  current  enemy.  Also  included  though,  were 
Belgians with no fixed domicile and more broadly those suspected of having 
relations with the enemy
11. 
For  the  final  preparation  of  administrative  internment  by  the  Belgian 
government-in-exile, the arrival of Walter Jean Ganshof van der Meersch in 
the middle of 1943 constituted a turning point. He defended a draft version of 
a circular prepared by himself and several magistrates of the Brussels Cour de 
Cassation. The above-mentioned decree-laws formed the basis of this draft 
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circular,  eventually  signed  after  certain  modifications  by  the  responsible 
Minister of Justice Antoine Delfosse in August 1944. The draft gave mayors 
full  responsibility  for  internment,  starting  with  the  actual  interning  and 
including  release,  housing,  food  and  clothing.  In  the  context  of  the  re-
establishing  the  state,  the  mayors  were  regarded  as  the  key  local-level 
protagonists  for  stabilising  the  central  state  and  as  such  ensuring  public 
order
12. 
Five  reasons  explain  the  Belgian  magistrates’  choice  of  the  mayor  as 
executor:  he  was  the  state  representative  closest  to  the  people;  he  was 
responsible for upholding law and order and had close ties with the police 
(under his command) and the gendarmerie; he was responsible for the supply 
of food; and he could lay claim on buildings for internment and people as 
guards
13. These reasons did not however convince all the ministers on the 
committee. Uncertainty about the timely arrival of the circular and doubts 
about the availability of mayors in the first days after liberation made certain 
politicians doubt this strict reliance on mayors. After a first discussion, the 
civil and military prosecutors and Secret Service agents were also given the 
competence of interning people. For rural communities, the responsible local 
district commissioner was also added, to avoid any lack of action at local level 
due to possibly non-existent state authority. 
The primary goal of the circular was to organize the internment of “suspects”. 
This meant that the target group in general consisted of every person older 
than sixteen years suspected of relations with the enemy. More specifically, 
the circular considered paramilitary and military collaborators as the primary 
and the most important group needing internment. Basically free to act behind 
Allied frontlines, it is not difficult to imagine the threat these collaborators 
posed  to  ongoing  military  operations.  The  second  category  consisted  of 
persons who had had ties to the German administrative services. The third 
was a catch-all group for those whose behaviour during the enemy occupation 
made  them  a  possible  source  of  unrest  due  to  possible  vengeance  acts  or 
because  of  the  fact  that  their  liberty  caused  a  public  scandal
14.  This  last 
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category proves that the Belgian government gave higher priority to a calm 
Belgian populace during these trying times than to the possible innocence of 
an individual. The potential risks were too big. 
How the internment camps were to be organized in the long run was not 
determined  in  any  great  detail  by  the  Belgian  government-in-exile.  The 
ministers expressly opted for flexibility instead of a detailed blueprint. This 
was partly due to the uncertainty over exactly how and at what speed the 
liberation  of  Belgium  would  actually  take  place.  Nevertheless,  the 
aforementioned specialist Delierneux expressed his concern and frustration 
about the lack of any further planning on several occasions. In April 1944, he 
sent Ganshof a detailed plan of public buildings in West Flanders which could 
serve as sorting centres, as short-term and longer-term internment camps and 
also  as  substitute  camps  for  regular  prisons  in  cases  of  incarceration.  For 
Delierneux, administrative internment was a punishment tool. His view was 
thus  fundamentally  different  to  the  way  the  Belgian  government-in-exile 
viewed internment. As such Delierneux did not have any direct influence on 
the planning of the other policy-makers. The usefulness of his work remained 
limited to the detailed list of public buildings which he deemed suitable for 
internment.  Although  Delierneux  promised  to  compile  a  complete  set  of 
buildings for the whole country, no document of this kind has been found 
until now
15. 
It  is  difficult  to  make  any  estimates  on  the  number  of  Belgians  the 
government expected to arrest during and after liberation. It is a known fact, 
however, that, during the period of exile in London, the Belgian State Security 
compiled more than 70,000 files on collaborators. Moreover, during a meeting 
of  the  Commission  of  Justice  for  the  Ministry  of  Justice  in  1943,  High 
Commissioner Ganshof van der Meersch mentioned the possibility of tens of 
thousands of trials for collaboration with the enemy
16. This leads us to the 
conclusion  that,  at  least  on  a  theoretical  level,  the  government  took  into 
account that administrative internment could easily involve tens of thousands 
of civilians. 
In  the  Netherlands,  the  arrest  and  administrative  internment  of  persons 
suspected of collaboration became possible under Article 16 of the decree on 
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the Special State of Siege. It was decided that the Military Authority was the 
only power able to intern and release people suspected of collaboration. With 
this Article the judiciary was thus out of the game. In early November 1943, a 
memorandum on internment was written by Major W. Molenaar, the officer 
appointed responsible for the internment camps and himself no stranger to 
incarceration, having before the war been director of the prison in The Hague 
and, like Ganshof, closely involved in the Belgian May 1940 internments
17. 
The memorandum stated that every person suspected of collaboration should 
be  arrested  following  the  liberation  of  the  Netherlands.  All  males  having 
joined the Dutch National Socialist Movement (NSB) after July 1942 were to 
be put behind barbed wire – an estimated 50,000 men. It was however taken 
into account that some might still be fighting on the Eastern front and might 
not survive. Furthermore, all other collaborators and traitors and perhaps also 
most female members of the NSB were supposed to be arrested, pushing up 
the estimated total to 100,000. Actual internment figures would go to show 
that this estimate was not far off.  
The government assumed that the first few days after liberation were going to 
be  very  chaotic  and  that  above  all  nothing  much  could  be  expected  with 
regard to accommodation in the internment camps. Setting up the facilities in 
liberated areas was supposed to take place as quickly as possible, with local 
authorities  expected  to  take  care  of  all  problems  until  the  arrival  of  the 
Military  Commissioners.  The  responsibility  given  to  the  Dutch  local 
authorities was similar to that of the Belgian mayors, the one difference being 
the non-institutionalized and temporary role of the former. Once the situation 
was stabilized the NMA would centralize the internment practices.  
Dutch prisons and internment camps were also inventoried. Reserved for the 
“the  country’s  most  insidious  and  dangerous  elements”,  prisons  offered  a 
lesser risk of detainees escaping and gave the authorities the possibility to 
incarcerate people in isolation. Molenaar did not yet reckon with capacity 
problems. He furthermore hoped that the NMA could use the local camps set 
up  by  the  Germans,  such  as  the  concentration  camps  at  Vught  and 
Westerbork. As such, the possibility to intern thousands of people at once was 
possible and the necessary resources, such as bunk beds, were supposed to be 
available right from the start. Because of the logistical cost and other possible 
problems, Molenaar wanted to avoid the creation of small internment camps. 
Hence  big  new  camps  had  to  be  designed.  Possibilities  for  the  temporary 
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accommodation  of  internees  included  large  factories  or  schools.  The 
administration of the camps was considered a big deal and therefore given 
great attention.  
In March 1944, detailed instructions for the future camp commanders were 
issued
18. It was the intention of the Military Authority to set up two kinds of 
camps. On the one hand, the government wanted to set up holding camps (or 
verblijfkampen) for the milder cases, i.e. collaborators who could in the end 
turn out to be “good”, but still had to be interned for their own safety. On the 
other hand, there were detention camps (or bewaringskampen) designed for 
really  severe  cases.  These  were  supposed  to  have  a  “humiliating  and 
degrading”  character.  Dutch  internment  policy  thus  appeared  to  have  two 
opposite purposes: internment for protection and internment for punishment 
and humiliation. 
The measures provided for by the Dutch government in London were in a 
much  more  advanced  state  than  those  of  their  Belgian  colleagues.  For 
Belgium, a major degree of flexibility in internment practices was paramount. 
In its design, internment appeared to be more a means of maintaining public 
order than of punishing collaboration, with the exile government particularly 
worried about possible political unrest during and after liberation. However, 
this was all very nice in theory - the actual situation in the liberated countries 
would be a bitter pill for both governments. 
Plans put to the test: the liberation  
Belgium  was  liberated  in  September  -  October  1944
19.  The  government 
returned  to  Belgium  on  8  September  and  the  HC  took  up  its  role  of 
coordinating and maintaining law and order. The internment of collaborators 
was one of the most important tasks to be dealt with. The agreements made in 
London were put firmly to the test. Following the liberation of any area, chaos 
almost always immediately ensued. The internments had to be carried out 
quickly to prevent suspects from fleeing to Germany. By August 1944, 15,000 
Flemings and 10,000 Walloons had already crossed the German border. 
The Belgian government explicitly and repeatedly prohibited the resistance 
movements from interfering with the maintenance of law and order during the 
liberation. This did not however stop the resistance fighters from assuming 
 
18  Instructie  voor  de  commandanten  van  de  bewarings-  en  verblijfkampen,  March  1944 
(National  Archives  of  the  Netherlands,  Archives  of  the  Netherlands  Military  Authority, 
n° 1342).  
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the task of chasing down collaborators. In the chaotic circumstances of the 
liberation,  lots  of  people  were  rounded  up  and  put  into  whatever 
accommodation was available, often not very enviable. The resistance also did 
not always follow the prescribed legal procedure for internment. As such, a 
large  number  of  illegal  internments  were  carried  out  during  the  first  two 
months following liberation. In that same period, hatred for the friends and 
supporters of the German occupants was expressed among the population and 
the resistance through maltreatment on the street and also in the improvised 
internment  camps.  The  destruction  of  houses  and  furniture  and  the  public 
humiliation of women suspected of “horizontal” collaboration are well-known 
facts stemming from these feelings of frustration
20. 
There is a twofold explanation for the important role of resistance movements 
and the great number of illegal administrative internments. First of all, the 
Belgian liberation by the Allies happened very quickly. Although valuable, 
the actual military role of the Belgian resistance was for the most part of 
secondary importance. In the wake of the Allied armies, the resistance groups 
wanted to demonstrate their importance in their liberated surroundings where 
known collaborators moved about freely. Their attention thus turned to this 
urgent task of arresting the supporters of the enemy.  
The second reason for their predominant role and, subsequently, for the often 
illegal  use  of  administrative  internment  is  to  be  found  in  the  missing 
commitment of the designated state authorities. On the one hand, the HC, 
State Security agents, gendarmerie and police regularly reported the refusal of 
mayors, especially Catholic ones, to cooperate in the policy of administrative 
internment. This had been anticipated neither by the Belgian government-in-
exile nor by the magistrates in Belgium responsible for drafting the circular. 
They  had  assumed  that  the  mayors  would  loyally  fulfil  their  role  of 
representing the central state authority. Evidence suggests however that the 
Belgian mayors opted to act more in line with the other side of their function: 
that of the locally elected politician. The mayor of the city of Tongeren stated, 
for  example,  that  he  was  not  impartial  enough  to  carry  out  this  new 
responsibility. In Bruges, the mayor also explicitly refrained from taking any 
action  on  his  own  responsibility
21.  Until  now,  scientific  research  on  the 
 
20 Martin Conway, “Justice in Postwar Belgium: Popular Passions and Political Realities”, in 
Istvan Deák, Jan Tomasz Gross, Tony Judt (ed.), The Politics of Retribution in Europe. World 
War II and Its Aftermath, New Jersey, 2000, p. 133-156. 
21 “Rapport sur la situation à Bruges”, 13 September 1944. (CEGESOMA. Partial archives of 
François-Louis  Ganshof  concerning  the  year  1940,  liberation  and  military  status,  n° 14) 
“Tongeren”, 1944-1945. (National Archives of Belgium, Archives of the High Commissariat 
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resistance movement and their role in post-liberation internment in Belgium 
has focused almost solely on their abuses – such as pressuring mayors to sign 
blank warrants for administrative internment or interning people without the 
necessary  documents.  The  hitherto  unknown  refusal  of  many  mayors  to 
cooperate in the legal procedure gives this one-sided picture a new dimension. 
On the other hand, the gendarmerie and the police were indeed undermanned 
and  lacked  the  necessary  weaponry.  Moreover,  these  state  institutions 
themselves  needed  to  be  purged  after  having  functioned  for  years  under 
German occupation. The resistance movements ended the war with a halo of 
heroism and patriotism. They appeared as the moral arm of the population and 
as such they considered themselves empowered to distinguish between the 
good and bad elements of that same population. 
When arrested, Belgians suspected of collaboration were put in one of the 
many  internment  camps  or  existing  prisons.  A  total  of  approximately 
170 different  local  camps  where  known  to  the  Belgian  authorities.  It  is 
possible though that a number of the often very temporary facilities used at 
the start of the liberation remained unrecorded. Within a short period of time, 
some  60,000  to  70,000  people  were  interned.  By  comparison:  before  the 
Second World War, the regular Belgian prisons only held 5,000 prisoners. 
Due to this extremely high number of internees, living conditions in almost all 
camps were abysmal: adequate accommodation, hygiene, and food supplies 
were  extremely  difficult  to  obtain  during  these  post-liberation  days  and 
months, especially during the hard winter. These shortcomings were related to 
the continuing war and transport problems. Due to chaotic and often badly 
managed internments, the legal situation of many internees posed an acute 
problem, with all kinds of suspects locked up together, frequently without any 
detention order. 
Another  pressing  problem  was  the  unprofessional  way  the  resistance 
movements performed their guard duties, with physical and mental abuse a 
well-known  occurrence.  The  mistreatment  of  internees  has  always  been  a 
difficult subject to quantify. Abuse was on the whole limited to the months of 
September  and  -  to  a  lesser  degree  -  October.  Other  often  discussed 
wrongdoings, confusingly labelled as abuse by the government, concerned 
guards’ unprofessional behaviour in the other sense: accepting payment by 
internees  for  such  favours  as  an  extra  package  of  food  or  clothes  or  the 
delivery of a higher than normally allowed amount of letters addressed to the 
family. In some cases guards let suspects temporarily leave the internment 
camp  to  work  on  their  fields.  Such  types  of  misconduct  are  not  only 
attributable to the fact that the guards had received no professional training for 
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the fact that quite a number of guards had to wait several months before being 
paid.  
The situation in the Netherlands was quite similar, apart from the fact that in 
September 1944 only parts of the southern Netherlands had been liberated by 
the Allied forces. As a result, many members of the NSB could flee to the 
northern half of the country or to Germany. It is estimated that 60,000 of them 
reached the soon to be defeated Third Reich. In the meantime, the Dutch 
government and Queen stayed in London, with the NMA acting as the interim 
government. As decided in London, the NMA was in charge of the arrest of 
all suspected collaborators. Nevertheless the situation remained unclear when 
the Military Commissioners started arriving on 11 September. The NMA had 
reckoned on the Dutch police carrying out the arrests, but it seemed that, as in 
Belgium,  the  police  needed  to  be  purged  thoroughly  before  being  able  to 
arrest collaborators. Pending the arrival of the military and the “clean” police, 
the resistance immediately began to arrest and lock up local suspects in the 
liberated areas, using all forms of available accommodation.  
A battle for the power to arrest ensued. The outcome was that the NMA gave 
a detachment of the Dutch Resistance, the so-called “Dutch Armed Forces” 
under Commander Prince Bernhard, the power to arrest suspects. This was 
however not without problems. The former Resistance held quite a different 
opinion  on  the  categories  of  persons  needing  to  be  arrested.  Firstly,  they 
wanted to arrest Dutch Nazi party members who had joined up after May 15, 
1940, instead of after 1942 as the NMA had first decided in London. Also on 
their list were women who had maintained relationships with Germans during 
the  occupation,  traitors  and,  furthermore,  German  nationals  living  in  the 
Netherlands.  According  to  the  Resistance, changes  in  the  arrest  lists  were 
necessary because the London guidelines of the NMA had underestimated the 
true extent of collaboration
22.  
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Table 2 
Dutch internment camp Vught in 1945 
Source: NIOD Image Bank WWII 
After the arrest of 20.000 - 25.000 people, all kind of suspects were locked up 
together  and,  as  in  Belgium,  temporarily  interned  in  the  accommodation 
available. The NMA’s London idea of having two different kinds of camps 
(one  for  the  more  severe  and  one  for  “light”  cases)  came  to  nothing.  As 
planned, local prisons were also used but soon became overcrowded. This was 
not  what  the  NMA  had  in  mind  in  London,  since  they  wanted  to  avoid 
repeating the German practice of putting three people in one prison cell
23. In 
January 1944 the NMA had already expressed its concern about the facilities 
needed to run the camps. With its requests unheard, this problem was far from 
solved at liberation. The Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force 
(SHAEF) concluded in October 1944 that the situation was untenable, with 
too  little  space  available  for  all  suspects  in  the  southern  Netherlands
24. 
Overall, it was completely unclear how many people were actually interned 
 
23 Enige beschouwingen betreffende zuivering Gevangenis-personeel en organisatie Kampen 
van Bewaring, Londen, 04-11-1943 (National Archives of the Netherlands, Archives of the 
Netherlands Military Authority, nr. 1342). 
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and where exactly they were located. Although it was officially forbidden to 
intern persons under the age of 18, a lot of children and babies also got put 
into the internment camps. Even pregnant women and elderly and ill people 
were to be found in the camps. Though camp commanders often tried to send 
these people home, the ultimate decision for release depended on the outcome 
of investigations – and these generally progressed very slowly. Only when the 
results of the investigation showed that a person was no threat to the local 
community was a camp commander able to (conditionally) set someone free.  
The NMA chief of staff, Commander H.J. Kruls, had supreme command over 
the camps. According to NMA guidelines, the staff of the internment camps 
had to belong to the military. The local commander of the Resistance was in 
charge of an internment camp, responsible for food, supplies, clothing etc. He 
would appoint a camp commander, “considering the choice of a powerful, yet 
sedate personality, so that SS- and Gestapo methods, as well as indulging in 
revenge, can be avoided from the beginning”. Mistreatment of suspects was 
strictly prohibited: “discipline must be strict, but maintained in a dignified 
manner”
25. Nevertheless, cases of mistreatment were reported. In Maastricht, 
for example, when the internees had to work outside the camps, the guards 
(either former resistance members or Allied soldiers) played sadistic games 
with them, encouraged by local people. Although inspections were frequent, 
camp commanders were not always able to prevent internees being beaten up 
within the camp. Shocked by such misconduct, a Dutch reporter painted a 
vivid  picture  of  camp  conditions  in  early  1945,  referring  in  the  local 
newspaper to “Dachau in Maastricht”
26. 
The  Netherlands  were  not  completely  liberated  until  May  1945.  Around 
100,000 suspected collaborators were arrested in the newly liberated areas. It 
did  not  take  long  for  stories  about  their  mistreatment  to  start  circulating. 
Reports of mishandling reached the media in the summer of 1945 and the 
NMA set up a special commission to inspect all existing internment camps. 
Several internees were questioned about alleged conditions and hundreds of 
police reports were filed. The investigation confirmed mistreatment in certain 
camps. In particular from September 1944 until July 1945, internees were 
insulted, kicked and beaten by some of the guards. At other camps however, a 
different picture arose, with many inmates claiming never to have seen any 
mistreatment  and  stating  that  they  were  being  treated  correctly  by  their 
 
25 Richtlijnen voor het inrichten van plaatselijke bewarings- en verblijfskampen, March 1945 
(National Archives of the Netherlands, Archives of the Netherlands Military  Authority, nr. 
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guards. Although camp life was no picnic, considering the circumstances it 
was not too bad. After a while, internees were for example allowed to receive 
visitors once a month and write a letter home. When not working, they could 
read books or newspapers and play games. The longing for home however 
engendered a sad mood, especially in woman who longed for their children. 
Furthermore,  the  long  duration  of  investigations  caused  great  uncertainty 
about the future
27. 
Conclusion 
In both Belgium and the Netherlands, people suspected of collaboration with 
the  Germans  were  locked  up  during  the  liberation  of  Europe.  But  the 
experience gained between September 1944 and the end of the war led to the 
situation improving after May 1945. In Belgium, the HC stopped functioning 
in November 1945 and two months earlier a study group was set up to deal 
with  the  risen  difficulties  of  massive  incarceration  of  suspects.  In  the 
Netherlands, the MA ceased to exist in January 1946, with its control over the 
internment camps transferred to the Ministry of Justice. As such, the regular 
state institutions took the problem into their own hands. 
The administrative internment of enemies of the state proved to be a hard task 
for  both  countries.  Both  governments-in-exile  made  early  plans  for 
internment. This was a national matter. In the absence of international law 
providing the necessary guidelines, both countries automatically fell back on 
the traditions of their national legislation. For Belgium, the experience gained 
during  the  First  World  War  greatly  influenced  the  development  of 
administrative internment. As had been the case then, the measure remained 
an instrument for maintaining law and order. The Belgian ministers in London 
were  especially  worried  about  possible  post-liberation  political  unrest  and 
their overall legitimacy as rulers of the country. Internment was needed to 
keep the country in check. In the Netherlands, the punishment of collaborators 
seemed  more  an  end  than  a  means.  Strong  views  existed  about  totally 
removing collaborators from Dutch society, with the London notion of two 
different kinds of camps fitting into this picture. 
It seems that the practical internment measures foreseen by the Dutch exile 
government  in  London  were  much  further  developed  than  those  of  their 
Belgian colleagues. In Belgium, flexibility and adaptability were given much 
 
27 Rapporten van de 'vliegende colonne' van Sectie II D van Militair Gezag inzake inspectie van 
bewarings-  en  verblijfskampen,  alsmede  processen  verbaal  van  verhoren  van 
gedetineerden,1945  (National  Archives  of  the  Netherlands,  Archives  of  the  Netherlands 
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greater priority. However, in both countries the situation on the ground soon 
turned out to be more problematic for both governments, having to deal with a 
host  of  different  problems  concerning  administrative  internment  in  all  its 
aspects between September 1944 and the end of 1945. At the end of the day, 
neither  the  Dutch  blueprint  nor  the  Belgian  flexibility  proved  to  be  a 
guarantee for success. NOTICES BIOGRAPHIQUES 
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